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TAXATION - FEDERAL INCOME TAX- FULL PAYMENT A PREREQUISITE TO 
REFUND SUIT - A tax deficiency of $28,908.60 including interest was levied 
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue against the petitioner for a single 
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tax year. Petitioner paid $5,058.54 but later filed a claim for refundl which 
was disallowed by the Commissioner. On suit by petitioner in a United 
States district court for the refund,2 the court held the petitioner was not 
entitled to the refund because the claimed losses were actually capital in 
nature.3 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and dismissed 
the complaint on the ground that the district court could not have juris-
diction until there had been full payment of the assessed deficiency.4 On 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, one justice 
dissenting.5 On rehearing,6 held, affirmed, four justices dissenting.7 Con-
gress has erected a comprehensive structure of tax procedure premised upon 
the general understanding that full payment was a prerequisite to a refund; 
to rule otherwise now would produce disharmony within this structure and 
would obstruct tax collection. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960). 
Whether full payment of an assessed deficiency is required before a dis-
trict court has jurisdiction of a refund suit is dependent upon the construc-
tion of the controlling jurisdictional statute. This statute states: 
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction ... of ... any 
civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-
revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously . . . collected, or any 
penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum 
alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected 
under the internal-revenue laws .... "8 
Since no penalty was involved here, the questions raised are whether 
"tax" refers only to the full amount assessed and whether the meaning of 
"any sum" precludes the argument that the payment of part of the assessed 
tax could be regarded as the payment of "any sum."9 
lFiling such a claim is a prerequisite to suit. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §7422(a). 
2 Suit was brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1346 (a) (I) (1958). 
3 Flora v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 602 (D.C. Wyo. 1956). 
4 Flora v. United States, 246 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1957). 
5 Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63 (1958). 
6 The rehearing was granted in Flora v. United States, 360 U.S. 922 (1959). 
7 Justices Whittaker, Frankfurter, Harlan and Stewart dissented. They argued, int~r 
alia, that enough cases had allowed a refund suit without questioning the fact of partial 
payment to preclude a finding of general understanding that full payment was required, 
and that allowing partial payment would not produce significant disharmony within the 
present collection system. 
s 28 U.S.C. §1346 (a) (I) (1958). (Emphasis added.) 
9 The majority believed that "any sum" referred to amounts, such as interest, which 
were neither taxes nor penalty. The lower federal courts were split on this question. Full 
payment was not required in some district court cases brought at a time when the unpaid 
assessment could be concurrently litigated before the Board of Tax Appeals. Brampton 
Woolen Co. v. Field, 55 F.2d 325 (D.C. N.H. 1931) (ultimately decided in the govern• 
ment's favor on another jurisdictional ground); Emery v. United States, 27 F.2d 992 (W.D. 
Pa. 1928); Old Colony R.R. v. United States, 27 F.2d 994 (D.C. Mass. 1928). Full payment 
was expressly not required in Bushmiaer v. United States, 230 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1956); 
Hanchett v. Shaughnessy, 126 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. N.Y. 1954); Sirian Lamp Co. v. Manning, 
123 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1941); Coates v. United States, 111 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1940). Full 
payment was required in Rogers v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. N.Y. 1957); Suhr 
v. United States, 18 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1927). 
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This phraseology first appeared not in a jurisdictional provision but in 
a statute of limitation10 concerned with the time for the initiation of a 
refund suit against the collector. The meaning of the disputed language is 
not illuminated by committee reports, for there were none at that time, nor 
by the congressional debates.11 Thus, in the absence of any persuasive 
judicial interpretation12 contemporary with its enactment, it was reasonable 
for the Court in interpreting this language to give weight to the fact that 
Congress had subsequently erected a comprehensive tax collection procedure 
which apparently assumed that full payment was required in order to obtain 
jurisdiction in a district court. For example, the primary motivation for 
the creation of the Board of Tax Appeals appears to have been the desire to 
relieve a taxpayer of the hardships which resulted from requiring full 
payment before permitting litigation of the correctness of the assessment.13 
Furthermore, the Declaratory Judgment Act was amended to exclude tax 
disputes in order to preserve the principle of "pay first and litigate later."14 
To allow part payment would, in effect, permit the taxpayer to circumvent 
this exclusion by paying $5.00 on a $1,000.00 assessment and then litigating 
the assessment in a district court. 
In addition to wishing to prohibit part payment when it was apparent 
that later legislators intended a requirement of full payment, the Court was 
also of the view that to allow part payment now would disrupt the efficient 
operation of existing tax laws.15 It was feared that permitting partial pay-
ment might force widespread exercise of the discretionary power of dis-
traint10 to collect the tax assessed and that the public indignation resulting 
from subjection to this treatment might operate to destroy the present 
10 17 Stat. 257 (1872). 
11 For reference to the complete congressional debates on the bill encompassing this 
provision, see CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. at lvi, cxcii (1872) (bill H.R. 2322). 
12The Court did argue that dictum in Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85 (1875)-
a case involving a refund suit against the collector initiated under the 1866 claim for 
refund requirement, 14 Stat. 152, which required suit to be brought within six to twelve 
months after the claim arose - constituted authoritative interpretation of the disputed 
language. However, it was after that suit was begun, though before decision, that the 
statute of limitations was passed which initiated this disputed language. This latter statute 
provided a two-year limitation. Supra note IO. This dictum relied upon describes the tax 
procedures at that time, but it indicates no cognizance of the change in limitation; indeed, 
the dictum alludes to an "appeal," which was the terminology for the six to twelve months 
limitations. 
13 43 Stat. 336 (1924). See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1924); S. REP. No. 
!198, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1924); 65 CONG. R.Ec. 2621, 2689, 8IIO (1924); 67 CONG. R.Ec. 
525, II44, 3529, 3755 (1925-1926). There is also some suggestion that this tribunal was 
created to obviate the anti-injunction provision now found in INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, 
§7421. See principal case at 158. 
14 48 Stat. 955 (1934), amended by 49 Stat. 1027 (1935), as amended, 28 U .S.C. §§2201, 
2202 (1958). See S. REP. No. 1240, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935); principal case at 164. 
15 Principal case at 160, I 76. 
16 INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, §6331 provides for the seizure and sale of taxpayer's prop• 
erty for failure to pay the tax within ten days of notice and demand. This power is not 
available during Tax Court litigation. See note 18 infra. 
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practice of voluntary payment and assessment.17 On the other hand, it was 
argued by the dissent that any delay in payment resulting from part pay-
ment suits should not necessitate exercise of the distraint power, for there 
is also delay in collection when the taxpayer litigates in the Tax Court.18 
While this will remain a speculative issue, it should be noted that there 
would probably be more delay with a district court disposition due to 
clogged dockets.19 Moreover, a multiplication of such delay would be likely 
because the allowance of partial payment suits might induce many tax-
payers to litigate in the district courts in order to take advantage not only 
of the longer limitation period applicable to refund suits20 but also of what 
many practitioners apparently believe to be the more favorable treatment 
afforded taxpayers in the district courts.21 While such delay might not be 
enough to force the exercise of the distraint power, it would at least con-
tribute to lesser efficiency in tax collection. Also, part payment could neces-
sitate making an investigation in each case in order to decide whether the 
financial condition and integrity of the particular taxpayer made it advis-
able to exercise the power of distraint. Thus, more man-hours might be 
required to collect the same amount of tax dollars. 
The only significant positive argument in favor of permitting part 
payment is premised upon the belief that a full payment requirement will 
work hardships on some taxpayers.22 Nevertheless, in view of the mani-
J.7 Principal case at 176. 
18 Principal case at 194. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §6213 (a) prevents assessments or 
collections until the Tax Court reaches a final decision and any appeals are final. The 
total amount of refund suits pending as of June 30, 1959, was $500,619,000; as of the same 
date the Tax Court had before it, not subject to immediate collection, $810,057,000 in tax 
deficiencies, $108,515,000 in penalties and $640,664,000 in overpayments. 1959 Coim'R. INT. 
REv. ANN. REP. 128, 130, tables 17, 20. 
19 It appears that in the more congested centers, at least, the district court is a slower 
tribunal than the Tax Court. Emmanuel, Federal Tax Refund Procedure, 5 Fu. L. REv. 
133, 136 (1952). 
20 In refund suits, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §6511 (a) provides a limitation on filing the 
claim for refund of 3 years from the time the return was due, or 2 years from the time 
the tax was paid, whichever is greater; this is followed by a two-year statute of limitation 
on suit in the district court. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §6532 (a) (1). In comparison, follow-
ing the notice of deficiency, the ta.xpayer has only 90 days within which to bring suit in 
the Tax Court. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §6213 (a). 
21 See Dockery, Refund Suits in District Courts, 31 TAXES 523 (1953). 
22 See "Morrison Lecture" of Dean Griswold, Mass. L.Q., Oct. 1958, pp. 98, 109; also 
3 RABKIN AND JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION §72.04 (6) (1956). 
Full payment can produce hardships for the taxpayer who, through ignorance of the con-
sequences, does not file suit before the Tax Court in time and who does not have the 
resources to make full payment. There are also hardships for taxpayers who are not able 
to determine within 90 days if they will have enough assets to cover the assessment when 
the assets are liquidated, or the taxpayer who chooses to sue for refund and starts liqui-
dating only to find, more than 90 days later, that his assets are not marketable or that the 
market value is substantially less than anticipated. One answer to these hardships is that 
they could have been avoided by going to the Tax Court and that when he elects to sue 
for a refund these are the risks which he knowingly undertakes. Full payment also creates 
hardships for those taxpayers who do not have recourse to the Tax Court and so must 
pay the full assessment if they ever wish to challenge the correctness and legality of the 
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fested congressional intent, the additional administrative problems, and the 
absence of persuasive proof of widespread, substantial hardships incident 
to full payment, the Court's decision is a reasonable one. However, this 
decision does indicate that it is time for Congress to consider in depth and 
detail the extent of hardship caused by requiring full payment and to ponder 
whether some statutory relief is appropriate. 
Stuart S. Gunckel 
1 CAL. UNEMP. INs. ConE §1262 states: "An individual is not eligible for unemployment 
compensation benefits, and no such benefits shall be payable to him, if he left his work 
because of a trade dispute." 
